Abstracts of Papers:

Thursday, July 17, 9:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.

ï Connections Between Philosophy Of Biology And Philosophy Of Psychology. Organizer: Valerie Hardcastle (valerie@vt.EDU).

Session One: Innateness

William Wimsatt (University of Chicago), "Extending Generative Entrenchment"

No Abstract

Andre Ariew, University of Rhode Island, "Wimsatt on Generative Entrenchment."

William Wimsatt (1986) offers the concept of generative entrenchment to account for (nearly all) the philosophical and ethological claims about innateness. Traits are generatively entrenched to the degree that they have a number of later developing traits depending on them. On Wimsatt's analysis a new distinction in terms of generative entrenchment should replace the more common innate/acquired distinction. I disagree. On the view presented in this essay, the innate/acquired distinction does not need replacing. Rather, I shall argue, many of the philosophical and ethological claims that Wimsatt seeks to preserve require scrutiny. From this viewpoint an account of innateness based on the concept of canalization does a better job than does Wimsatt's generative entrenchment account. A trait is canalized to the degree that its developmental outcome is environmentally invariant.

Dan McShea, Duke, "Feeling: the Proximate Cause of Behavior"

I argue that in mammals (at least), complex behavior is caused by mental structures intermediate between stimulus and action. These structures are the feelings or motivations. They cause behavior by providing general goals but without specifying particular actions. The feelings are many, distinct, and situation-specific; the complete repertoire of feelings which members of a species normally experience, each weighted according to its situation-specific intensity, is the species feeling profile.

Mammals use various perceptual and cognitive devices to interpret the world and to anticipate future events. Interpretations and anticipations in turn evoke feelings, which motivate behavior. In a given situation, many feelings may be evoked, orienting the animal to a number of different purposes at once. The ensuing struggle among feelings for supremacy is the essence of decision-making, and behavior is the result of the triumph of one feeling, or coalition of feelings, over all others. Differences in how situations are interpreted, in how they are presented to the feeling profile, vary among individuals, producing differences in behavior. In humans (at least), interpretative schemes also vary systematically among groups, accounting for cultural differences in behavior. I argue, however, that almost all intraspecific variation in behavior is consistent with a species-universal feeling profile.

Finally, I offer an account of the feeling profile and of its relation to behavior in terms of Wimsatt's (1986) and Salthe's (1993) developmental models.

ï Evolution as an (In-)Deterministic Process, Organizer: Timothy Shanahan Loyola Marymount University (email: tshanaha@lmumail.lmu.edu)

In a number of recent works philosophers of biology have crossed swords on the issue of whether evolutionary theory is an essentially statistical theory. Alexander Rosenberg (1994) and Barbara Horan (1994) have argued that while our best theory of evolution is likely to remain statistical, the actual process of evolution should be understood as a deterministic process. Robert Brandon and Scott Carson (1996), and Roberta Millstein (1996), on the other hand, maintain that both evolutionary theory and at least some of the processes it describes must be understood statistically. This debate raises a number of important issues concerning evolutionary biology: (1) Is evolutionary theory essentially a statistical theory? (2) Does the statistical nature of canonical formulations of evolutionary theory entail that evolutionary processes are themselves indeterministic? (3) Is there a source of indeterminism in evolution that is independent of any indeterminism introduced by the nature of fundamental physical processes? (4) Do the concepts of "fitness" and "drift" render evolutionary theory necessarily statistical? (5) What role might thought-experiments play in answering these questions? (6) What bearing, if any, does the issue of the statistical nature of evolutionary theory have on the ongoing realism/antirealism debate in the philosophy of science? The purpose of this symposium is: (1) to bring together some of the participants in this debate; (2) to summarize the arguments deployed on each side; (3) to identify points of agreement; (4) to isolate key issues that still divide participants; (5) to see how far these differences can be bridged; and (6) to assess the prospects for an eventual consensus on these issues.

Session One

Scott Carson, Ohio University, "Bell's Proof and the Stochastic Nature of Evolutionary Processes"

Evolutionary theory (ET) is replete with statistical generalizations. Some of the most fundamental concepts in the theory, such as drift and natural selection, can perhaps best be characterized as stochastic processes. There is a traditional metaphysical view that says that such generalizations reflect something about us and our epistemic limitations rather than something about the external world and the underlying ontological structure of reality. Since John Bell's redoubtable work in the 1960s it has been known that this traditional metaphysical view cannot be true for another scientific theory in which statistical generalizations play an important role: quantum mechanics (QM). But in the case of QM Bell's work provided a proof that a deterministic, hidden-variables account of these generalizations is not possible; in ET no such proof has yet been found, nor is one likely to be. This raises several important questions for the philosopher of biology. (1) Do the statistical generalizations of ET reflect a genuinely indeterministic process underlying the phenomena that they describe; (2) If there are reasons for thinking the answer to (1) is "yes", can this fact be proven in a manner similar to that used by Bell for QM? (3) If the answer to (2) is "no", are there nevertheless reasons for thinking that the answer to (1) is still "yes"? I will argue that the answers to these questions are, respectively, yes, no, and yes. In particular, I will maintain that even Bell's proof is convincing about the indeterministic character of QM only given certain antecedent assumptions and that, if that is so, it is reasonable to postulate similar antecedent assumptions about ET that support a similar conclusion about the stochastic nature of the processes described therein, and that this has important consequences for instrumentalists, realists, and anti-realists alike.

Roberta Millstein, University of Minnesota, "Determinism vs. Indeterminism: Either Way, Evolution Is Probabilistic," Rosenberg (1994) and Horan (1994) argue that although evolutionary theory is statistical, it has this character purely for instrumental reasons; the evolutionary process is a deterministic one. Brandon and Carson (1996) challenge Rosenberg's and Horan's claims; instead, they maintain that a scientific realist should conclude that the evolutionary process is fundamentally indeterministic. I will argue that a more philosophically defensible position argues neither for the fundamental determinacy nor indeterminacy of the evolutionary process. However, even without making these kinds of empirical claims, we can still make arguments concerning the probabilistic character of evolution. That is, it remains an open question as to whether evolution is inherently and unavoidably probabilistic. Brandon and Carson (1994), as well as Sober (1984), maintain that even if evolution is deterministic at the individual level, it is probabilistic at the population level. While I am essentially in sympathy with these arguments, I don't think they make their case as strongly as they might. I seek to show that even if one assumes that the evolutionary process is fundamentally deterministic, the status of natural selection and random drift as population-level processes implies that evolutionary theory is inherently (and unavoidably) probabilistic.

ï Teaching Darwin and Darwinism. The principal objective of the symposium is to share resources, experiences, and techniques in exploring Darwin the scientist, Darwin the thinker, Darwin and Darwinism in its Victorian context, and Darwin and Darwinism today. Interdisciplinary approaches and innovative teaching methods would be the focus of attention. Organizers: David Blitz (Blitz@ccsu.edu) and Surindar Paracer (SParacer@vax.clarku.edu). We invite fellow members of the society from philosophy, biology, English, economics, medicine and other disciplines to contribute 20 minute papers or presentations to this symposium.

Session One:

1. Prof. Robert Hartwig, Department of Business Administration and

Economics, Worcester State College, "Darwinian Revolution: An Integrative Approach Featuring Biology and Economics at Worcester State College

2. Prof. Surindar Paracer, Department of Biology, Worcester State

College, Worcester, MA 01602, "Darwinian Revolution: An Integrative Approach Featuring Biology and Economics at Worcester State College"

We will discuss the organization of a course that we jointly taught on Darwin's theory of evolution and social applications, focusing principally on biology and economics, as presented in a course at Worcester State College to a group of non-biology majors fulfilling their science requirement. The presentation will include: choice of reading materials, including original readings from Darwin and his precursors, commentators and critics. Pedagogic methods, theoretical problems in examining natural selection as a biological concept and its application in the economic sphere in theories of competition, as well as contrasting points of view based on mutual aid, symbiosis, cooperation, and game theory as models of human interactions will be explored. The course also examined Darwin's influence on many areas of intellectual endeavor over the last 140 years such as music, literature and psychology. We will evaluate our teaching strategies aimed at developing an interdisciplinary dialogue. Student responses to the course will all be analyzed.

ï Images of the Brain in History. Contributions could include images of the brain in classical antiquity; in medieval thought; in the seventeenth century; in modern times. Hopefully the session would show how our vision/understanding of the brain has been influenced throughout history by social, metaphysical and scientific concerns. The precise form the symposium takes will be decided in the light of the response to this call for papers. Organizer: C. U. M. Smith (c.u.m.smith@aston.ac.UK)

C.U.M.Smith, Aston University, "The Brain A Machine?"

That the brain is a machine has been a dominant image since René Descartes first proposed it in the seventeenth century. Indeed several prominent workers have maintained that at root contemporary neurophysiology has departed but little from Descartes' early vision (1,2,3). In this paper I consider Descartes' 'hydraulic' neurophysiology, what his notion of a machine amounted to and how far that notion still applies in modern times. I show that the machine image with its implication of automaticity has greatly evolved since the times of the Francini brothers in the early seventeenth century. If the image of the brain as a machine is still powerful in our age of AI and connectionist computers it is a very different image than that which Descartes posthumously published in 1662. It is also argued that Descartes' micromechanistic paradigm sits awkwardly with the predominantly morphological understandings of modern molecular neurobiology. Perhaps, indeed, ideas flowing from yet older traditions have returned in a modern guise to displace Descartes' geometrising iatrohydraulics. In sum it is concluded that a residual Cartesianism, far from representing the paradigm within which modern neuroscience operates, may in fact impede a proper understanding of brain functioning and dysfunctioning.

1. T. H. Huxley, 1874, in Collected Essays, vol.1, 1898 2. Foster, M., 1901, Lectures in the History of Physiology, p.278 3. Woodger, J.H., 1967, Biological Principles: a critical study, p.48

A. Edward Manier, University of Notre Dame, "How Does The Expression 'Emotional Thermostat' Work In 'Listening To Prozac'?

Peter Kramer's "Listening to Prozac" is a blend of case histories and current theories. The book is written for those of us worried about our timid and obsessive relatives. We are not all in a position to sort out the different theories behind Kramer's journalistic metaphors, "emotional thermostat" and "serotonin as police." Kramer makes rather extensive use of the work of C. Robert Cloninger, Donald F. Klein, Jerome Kagan, Michael McGuire and Steve Suomi, but gives little or no attention to folks like Joseph LeDoux and the other authors in Section IX, Emotion in "The cognitive neurosciences," M. Gazzaniga, ed., MIT, 1995. I will continue my work on the "invisible college of fear" by placing "Listening to Prozac" in the context of the current work on the neurobiology of temperament and emotion that it does and doesn't cite. The hope is that, along the way, we will all find out more about images of the emotional brain

ï Language in Science. This topic includes studies of how biologists use narratives, metaphors/analogies tropes, proverbs, and other modes of linguistic organization. Various approaches to the analysis of literary and conversational discourse would be appropriate. A few examples: narratives of action and behavior in natural history; literary metaphor in molecular biology; maxims and proverbs in biologistsí discourse; and the intersection of legal and scientific discourse in expert testimony. Organizer: Michael Lynch (michael.lynch@brunel.ac.uk).

Christine Hine and Michael Lynch, Brunel University, "Bionet Newsgroups: A Hybrid of Formal Protocols and Tacit Knowledge"

This is a study of messages exchanged by participants in a "bionet" newsgroup. This is a methods newsgroup in which participants discuss laboratory problems and exchange technical solutions. Topics of e-mail exchanges tend to be highly specific: "DNA Mass Ladder problems," "Reasons for PCR failure," "PKC assay in Hela cells" and "Size markers for sequencing gel." Newsgroup exchanges are a hybrid form of communication which is intermediate between situated "hands-on" instruction and formal protocols. Ethnographic studies of scientific practices often discuss a gap between formal accounts of method and the tacit knowledge at the bench. Like formal protocols, newsgroup exchanges are written, and they tend to address recurrent problems and solutions, but like hands-on lab work, newsgroup exchanges are highly specific. They provide a site in which tacit knowledge is made more explicit than in other forms of written communication. In this study we examine some of the linguistic conventions, sequential organization, and pragmatic uses of these methods exchanges.

Steven J. Fifield, University of MinnesotañTwin Cities, "A Case Study of the Rhetorical Construction of Biology in an Introductory Undergraduate Course"

Studies of scientific discourse focus on several contexts including laboratories, research articles, grant proposals and popularizations of science. However, we have paid little attention to scientistsí discourse as undergraduate science instructors. This paper is a study of a biochemist who teaches an introductory biology course at a large university in the U.S. I analyze his lectures as rhetorical constructions of biology meant to persuade students of particular accounts of biological knowledge. My analysis also draws on interviews with the participant concerning his views of teaching, learning and the nature of biological knowledge. In the lectures, biology is presented as a hierarchical collection of definitions and rules. The instructor assembles a ìbig pictureî by demonstrating how these pieces of biology fit together. The plausibility of this account of biological knowledge derives primarily from its internal coherence. Illustrations accompanying the lectures serve as grounds for presuming the reality of the physical and biological objects and processes pictured. The instructorís argumentation rarely includes appeals to experimental evidence or to procedures by which scientific knowledge is validated, which the instructor believes would add little to the coherence of his story. This case study suggests that scientists may construct accounts of scientific knowledge in response to the particular interpretative challenges they associate with undergraduate teaching. Scientistsí practices as teachers are therefore relevant to understanding the context-dependent nature of scientific discourse and knowledge construction.

Eileen Crist, Cornell University, (email: ec53@cornell.edu), "Science And Rhetoric: The Case Of Animal Sociobiology"

This paper examines the language of sociobiology. The aim is to understand the argumentative means that underlie the sociobiological portrayal of animals. The focus is on two conceptual facets of sociobiology: the use of an economic idiom as the main representational means of animal life; and the application of social-category concepts to animal relations and interactions. The application of an economic language is analyzed in terms of sociobiological mobility across technical and ordinary semantic domains. The use of ostensibly human social-category terms is addressed in terms of the problematic of "anthropomorphic" language in behavioral science. Overall, it is argued that the case of sociobiology demonstrates how the artful use of language contributes to empowering scientific argumentation.

ï Normative Issues in Genetics Organizer: David Magnus

In these sessions we will explore some of the key conceptual and causal notions associated with genetics and their normative implications. What is a genetic disease? What is the significance of applying that label? How has past usage of genetic concepts influenced medical practice, and what lessons does that hold for us today? One session will focus on the lessons to be learned from the past, while the other will focus more on the implications of recent work on causality and DNA.

Chair: Suzanne Holland, University of Puget Sound

Session One.

Diane Paul, University of Mass. at Boston , "Informed Consent and Newborn Screening"

In the last thirty years, the principle of informed consent has become fundamental to medicine. For a number of reasons, it has acquired its greatest authority in the realm of medical genetics, where the need for informed consent is enshrined in the policy statements of numerous organizations and even federal law. An Institute of Medicine committee recently reiterated the doctrine, recommending that no genetic test be performed "without the con- sent of the persons being tested or, in the case of newborns, the consent of their parents." Yet in respect to newborn screening, the principle has little practical force; in practice, testing is almost always mandatory. Of course gaps between theory and practice exists in many spheres of medicine. But its extent in respect to newborn screening reflects an unusually strong sentiment among health-care providers that informed consent here is inappropriate. That sentiment was recently expressed by a committee of the American College of Medical Genetics, which criticized the Institute of Medicine committee for insisting on the principle of voluntariness. In its view, requiring fully- informed consent for disorders such as PKU or hypothyroidism might seriously reduce the benefits from these programs and would greatly increase their costs. An earlier (and stronger) argument against consent requirements was based on the distinction between personal and parental autonomy. This talk explores the history of the controversy over informed consent in newborn screening and seeks to evaluate the arguments against it.

Glenn McGee, University of Pennsylvania, "The History of Eugenics and Contemporary Reproductive Medicine"

Contemporary discussion of genetics and public health raises again the spectre of eugenics. It is argued in my paper that it is possible to monitor and to some extent regulate genetic inheritance at a public health level without moving into eugenics, provided there are very clear distinctions made about the purposes and politics of public health efforts in genetic testing of adults and fetuses. An attempt is made to describe an appropriate form such distinctions might take in public health policy.

Kathy Cooke and David Valone, Quinnipiac College, "Nature and Nurture in Eugenics Past and Present"

In this paper I consider the role that concerns about environment played in American eugenics. Before about 1915 the typical American eugenicist considered environment as well as biological transfer of traits in their efforts to breed better Americans. I will sketch the history of eugenics as it came to be considered a more strictly hereditarian approach to breeding human beings, considering especially the changing editorship of the Journal of Heredity, and draw implications regarding the fears about eugenics today.

Thursday, July 17, 11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

ï Connections Between Philosophy Of Biology And Philosophy Of Psychology. Organizer: Valerie Hardcastle (valerie@vt.EDU).

Session Two: Teleology

Karen Neander, John Hopkins, "Teleosemantics and Adaptationism"

Fodor has argued that the natural teleology that underwrites Teleosemantics requires Adaptationism, which, as he defines it, is a dubious thesis at best. He further argues that we have no good reason to believe that adaptational explanations will even be important in explaining cognition. This paper replies to these objections. It explains why neither natural teleology nor Teleosemantics involves a commitment to Adaptationism, and why we do have a powerful reason to believe that adaptational explanations will be essential to explaining the evolution of cognition. This involves the "Argument for Selection," which is to the effect that cognition is the product of organized complexity and organized complexity requires an adaptational explanation.

Denis Walsh, Edinburgh, "The Dormitive Virtues of Teleological Explanation"

I will outline the general form of teleological explanations and argue that what distinguishes teleological explanations is their logical form and not the fact that they explain a feature's etiology. In the light of this, I will then discuss certain oddities of teleological explanations such as adaptational explanations, propositional attitude explanations. Finally, I will discuss how the latter reflects on the causal role of content.

ï Evolution as an (In-)Deterministic Process, Organizer: Timothy Shanahan Loyola Marymount University (email: tshanaha@lmumail.lmu.edu)

In a number of recent works philosophers of biology have crossed swords on the issue of whether evolutionary theory is an essentially statistical theory. Alexander Rosenberg (1994) and Barbara Horan (1994) have argued that while our best theory of evolution is likely to remain statistical, the actual process of evolution should be understood as a deterministic process. Robert Brandon and Scott Carson (1996), and Roberta Millstein (1996), on the other hand, maintain that both evolutionary theory and at least some of the processes it describes must be understood statistically. This debate raises a number of important issues concerning evolutionary biology: (1) Is evolutionary theory essentially a statistical theory? (2) Does the statistical nature of canonical formulations of evolutionary theory entail that evolutionary processes are themselves indeterministic? (3) Is there a source of indeterminism in evolution that is independent of any indeterminism introduced by the nature of fundamental physical processes? (4) Do the concepts of "fitness" and "drift" render evolutionary theory necessarily statistical? (5) What role might thought-experiments play in answering these questions? (6) What bearing, if any, does the issue of the statistical nature of evolutionary theory have on the ongoing realism/antirealism debate in the philosophy of science? The purpose of this symposium is: (1) to bring together some of the participants in this debate; (2) to summarize the arguments deployed on each side; (3) to identify points of agreement; (4) to isolate key issues that still divide participants; (5) to see how far these differences can be bridged; and (6) to assess the prospects for an eventual consensus on these issues.

Session Two:

Leslie Graves, University of Wisconsin - Madison; Barbara L. Horan, Georgia Southern University; and Alexander Rosenberg, University of Georgia, "Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory?"

We argue that Brandon and Carson's (1996) "The Indeterminate [sic] Character of Evolutionary Theory" fails to trace the probabilism of evolutionary theory to any indeterminism that might substantiate the postulation of ineliminable probabilistic propensities at the level of biological processes. We argue that their appeal to Bell's or perhaps von Neumann's no-hidden variable proofs is irrelevant and defective; that their arguments to the inevitability of drift mistake calculation artifacts for theoretical predictions; and that their interpretation of experiments in botany abdicates the responsibility of the experimental scientist to search for causes. We remain convinced that the probabilism of the theory of evolution is epistemic.

Timothy Shanahan, Loyola Marymount University, "Fitness, Drift, and the Omniscient Viewpoint"

By way of an analysis of the recent debate between Rosenberg and Horan, on the one hand, and Brandon/Carson and Millstein, I attempt to show how the interpretation of evolution as an essentially indeterministic process rests on two mistaken "dogmas" of evolutionary theory concerning the concepts of "fitness" and "drift". With Rosenberg and Horan, I argue that while any evolutionary theory that will be useful for beings with cognitive abilities similar to our own will employ statistical concepts, there are no good reasons to maintain that the evolutionary process is itself "autonomously indeterministic". A being with complete information about the evolutionary process and unlimited computational powers would have no need of the statistical concepts that appear in our current evolutionary theory. With Brandon/Carson, and Millstein, however, I agree that our best theory of evolution is likely to remain statistical. I conclude by assessing the significance of this fact for the issue of realism and instrumentalism in evolutionary biology.

Commentator: Robert Brandon, Duke University

ï Teaching Darwin and Darwinism. The principal objective of the symposium is to share resources, experiences, and techniques in exploring Darwin the scientist, Darwin the thinker, Darwin and Darwinism in its Victorian context, and Darwin and Darwinism today. Interdisciplinary approaches and innovative teaching methods would be the focus of attention. Organizers: David Blitz (Blitz@ccsu.edu) and Surindar Paracer (SParacer@vax.clarku.edu). We invite fellow members of the society from philosophy, biology, English, economics, medicine and other disciplines to contribute 20 minute papers or presentations to this symposium.

Session Two:

3. Prof. David Blitz, Department of Philosophy, Central Connecticut

State University, New Britain, Connecticut 06050, "Developing a Darwin web-site."

Demonstration of a fully-functioning web-site with searchable hypertext editions (including original pagination and illustrations) of Darwin's main evolutionary works, including Origin of Species (1st and 6th editions), Descent of Man, and Expression of Emotions, as well as two non-Darwinian 19th century theories of evolution (for comparison/contrast): Lamarck's Philosophical Zoology and Minaret's Genesis of Species. Discussion will include: setting up the site for use by both scholars and students, establishing hypertext linking of related passages, searching by key work, and developing a multi-volume table of contents and concept index.

4. Prof. Charles Blinderman, Department of English, Clark University,

Worcester, MA. 0610, "Natural and Unnatural Selection: Anthology of Darwinian

Literature"

The pandemic ignorance about Darwinism appears throughout the cultural strata. Cuomo installs Charles Darwin in a terrible trio (Stalin and Hitler the other criminals) for engendering the plague of Social Darwinism. It is a rare bird in the classroom, the lab, of the physician's office who can identify Lamarkianism; T. H. Huxley; the year (or the century) of publication of the Origin of Species; the ideological monkeying around in Dayton, Tennessee; the credenza of creationism, a list that could go on till doomsday. A Natural Selection; Anthology of Darwinian Literature, surveys the territory to effect a comprehensive view of the pre-Darwinian terrain, the peaks of which range from John Ray's wisdom of god to Philip Gosse's wisdom of the belly-button. It then moves on to the Victorian landscape, scrutinizing Spencer, Darwin, Kingsley, and, especially, Thomas Henry Huxley, who, along with Punch and W. S. Gilbert are there to entertain as well as inform. We survey memorial poets such as Tennyson, protoplasmic flambeaux such as Pater, the volcanic Tyndall, the shady Stevenson, Thomas Hardy, Jack London, and Stephen Crane.

ï Sessions On Core-Periphery Relations In Scientific Knowledge Production In The Life Sciences. Organizer: Marilia Coutinho (Universidade de Sao Paulo; mcoutinho@originet.com.br)

Session One: Core-Periphery Relations In Scientific Knowledge Construction In The Life Sciences ñ Theoretical Issues

Carlos Lopez Beltran (UNAM ñ Mexico), "Epistemological And Ethical Issues In The Core-Periphery Debate In The History And Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge"

This paper focuses on the trend within SKK community of characterizing decision making and theory choice in science, in parallel with the adoption of technologies, as the consequence of power structures. Recapitulating briefly the history of historiographical and sociological models for describing the relationships between Central and Peripheral Scientific communities (Ben-David, Basalla, Polanco) it concludes that the role of justifying asymmetries that was in former times ascribed to the spheres of epistemology and ethics have in recent years been fully taken on and vindicated by sociological, power-based, models. The actor-network model that Xavier Polanco uses in his account of World-Science describes no-way-out situation for weak and peripheral communities. My conclusion is that both ethical and epistemological (normative) considerations should be reintroduced in order for our role not only as ìscientists of scienceî but also as ìscience criticsî to be fulfilled. A parallel is drawn with feminist criticism of science, where both epistemic (objectivity) and ethical values must play a role in order to justify a transition towards equitably leveled field of dispute.

Enrique Martinez Larrechea, IVIC ñ Venezuela, "Dynamic Dimensions Of Theoretical Approaches In The Concept Of Peripheral Science"

The social organization of science has been frequently considered under approaches that lacked the necessary historical concern. Its conception of science as an institution which is identical to itself, with only one known historical route of institutional construction, made it prisoner to an externalist framework. The idea of ìperipheral scienceî emerges as a relational notion. Instead of describing an obvious eccentric nature of science as practiced in those countries excluded from the benefits of plain development, it focuses in the fact that such a ìperipheralî science belongs to an universal and internalized scientific matrix. According to unique phenomena, developments and articulations of institutional, disciplinary and cognitive nature, it is able to make decisive contributions. In this paper I will attempt to examine those dimensions within the efforts being made towards the construction of an Iberoamerican sociology of science.

Elizabeth Balbachevsky, Tathiana B. Alcantara and Marilia Coutinho, Universidade de Sao Paulo, "Trends In The Internationalization Of Scientific Activities In Globalized Economies ñ Examples From The Life Sciences In Brazil"

The two basic development strategy patterns displayed by third world countries ñ the protectionist import-substitution approach that insulated national scientific, technological and industrial systems from international competition and the opposite strategy of differential exploration of the international market ñ have resulted in important differences as to the structures of both Sci. & Tech. establishments and higher education systems. The internalization of development requirements and bases has produced a self-referent attitude where quality is not a determinant factor either in internal decisions or in the allocation of financial resources. It has also produced a scientific establishment highly concentrated in academic environments, with little connections or pressure from the industrial sector. During the nineties, where development strategies based on the protectionist import-substitution approach have generally failed, a serious crisis has been taking place in the sci.,tech.&HE structures it has engendered. Reactions towards the crisis are analyzed in a comparison of certain life science research endeavors in Brazil (Ecology, Zoology and Biotechnology).

ïScience & Society

Rivers Singleton, Jr., Case Western Reserve University, University of Delaware (email: oneton@udel.edu), "Delft Canals and Iowa Corn Fields: Bacteriology and Biochemistry at Iowa Stateî"

Lines of research inquiry that individual scientists pursue can have profound consequences for their careers, their institutions, and the broader disciplines within which they operate. Despite these far reaching consequences, however, the forces that lead a person to pursue one research line rather than another are as complex as the individual scientists personality. In this paper, I will explore the career of Chester Werkman, in the bacteriology department at Iowa State, as a case study to illustrate both the complexity of decisions about research programs, as well as the personal, institutional, and disciplinary consequences of those decisions.

Werkmanís career, during the 1930's, is an excellent case to explore these issues as well as intellectual connections between bacteriology and biochemistry. His laboratory trained several preeminent biochemists, in addition to many distinguished microbiologists. Three of his students, Lesser Krampitz, Merton Utter, and Harland Wood, as well as Werkman himself, were elected to the National Academy of Sciences, and they all made significant contributions to biochemistry, especially in intermediary metabolism. Werkman, however, did not begin his career as a biochemist; rather he was a traditional bacteriologist pursuing relatively uninteresting immunological research. His research program became more biochemical after the Dutch microbiologist/biochemist, A. J. Kluyver visited Iowa State during the spring and summer of 1932. Kluyver was a visiting professor of chemistry and bacteriology and delivered an extensive series of biochemical lectures on microbial metabolism. In the years following Kluyverís lectures, Werkmanís research program changed radically from pursuit of trivial bacteriology to an innovative biochemical inquiry into microbial metabolism. It was an extremely productive research program, and less than a decade after Kluyverís visit his laboratory was one of the foremost facilities for intermediary metabolism research in the country.

Lauro Galzigna, Department of Biochemistry, University of Padua, Italy

My experience as basic researcher first and applied researcher later was in the field of new synthetic molecules of medical interest. In some case I also considered problems of biodegradation and bioconversion of xenobiotics generated by the industry. To an University researcher, often motivated by sheer curiosity alone, industrial logic is generally obscure and often incomprehensible. Although the interested people claim the opposite, the string behind industrial research is the marketing, while that behind academic research may be, in addition to curiosity, the intellectual fashion of the time. In the field of the molecules of medical relevance, there are two obligatory strategies, either from the molecule to the market, or from the market to the molecule. The relationship between academic and industrial research has been considered in the past(see Nature 352, July-August 1991) and it appeared that about 25% of the pharmaceutical products on the market are the result of academic research, while investing in the latter yields a mean annual return of 28%, i.e. it is a good investment. A comparison between academic and industrial researchers reveals some differences, despite basically similar capabilities of the two and not too different activities in their respective working places. The problem is whether or not those differences are sufficient to indicate a true separation of the two worlds.

ï Normative Issues in Genetics Organizer: David Magnus

In these sessions we will explore some of the key conceptual and causal notions associated with genetics and their normative implications. What is a genetic disease? What is the significance of applying that label? How has past usage of genetic concepts influenced medical practice, and what lessons does that hold for us today? One session will focus on the lessons to be learned from the past, while the other will focus more on the implications of recent work on causality and DNA.

Chair: Suzanne Holland, University of Puget Sound

Session Two.

Cor Van der Weele, "DNA And Disease: Where Is Control Located?"

Within the picture that DNA controls who we are, genetics offers the ultimate diagnosis of disease; "there is nothing better". Given the complicated interactions in the development of most diseases, this picture selectively highlights genes; apart from that it also involves particular assumptions about control. When these diagnoses are offered to people in the form of genetic tests and thus enter the context of social life, the complexities of social life as well as those of disease development are relevant. Science offers this knowledge under the assumption that for individuals to know more is to make more responsible choices and to have more personal control. However, the choices offered by genetics are not enthusiastically welcomed by everyone and many people doubt whether knowing more is always to be preferred. Are they declining control? Or is personal control perhaps working on different assumptions? In my talk, I will analyze relationships between genetic control, medical control and personal control.

Robert T. Pennock, The University of Texas at Austin, "Pre-Existing Conditions: Disease Genes, Causation & The Future of Medical Insurance"

As tests that can identify genes associated with diseases proliferate faster than therapies, individuals face a problem: if they test positive for a disease gene they may find that prospective insurers say they have a "pre-existing condition" and deny them coverage on that basis. This paper explores the implications for the future of medical insurance of regarding genes in this manner, and examines some of the moral and conceptual difficulties. Looking simply at the level of causal interactions there is no reason to say that "the cause" of a disease is "genetic" and not "environmental." Thus, in a trivial sense, every disease may be said to have a pre-existing genetic component. I describe the CaSE model of the causal relation and show how it can help us understand the way tacit pragmatic assumptions are involved when we call something a "genetic disease." This lets us see where our moral choices lie. I propose that pre-existing conditions are not all equivalent from a moral point of view, and then, using a Rawlsian framework, argue that it would be unjust to deny access to insurance on the basis of genetic pre-conditions that are the result of life's lottery.

Thursday, July 17, 2:00 p.m.-3:30 p.m.

ï Connections Between Philosophy Of Biology And Philosophy Of Psychology. Organizer: Valerie Hardcastle (valerie@vt.EDU).

Session Three: Evolutionary Psychology

David Buller, Northern Illinois University, "DeFreuding Evolutionary Psychology"

Evolutionary psychologists sometimes suggest that "an evolutionary view of life can shed light on psyche" by revealing the "latent" psychology that underlies our "manifest" psychological image. At such moments, which are more frequent in popular works, explanations trade freely in subconscious motives whose goal is inclusive fitness. While some evolutionary psychologists explicitly deny that their aim is to uncover latent motivation, references to subconscious motives are nonetheless frequent in evolutionary psychology (and are even made by those explicitly denying postulation of subconscious motives). These explanatory references to subconscious motives pose a dilemma. On the one hand, if they are literal, evolutionary psychology is vulnerable to a criticism frequently leveled against sociobiology: if subconscious motives toward inclusive fitness are the true determinants of human behavior, our behavior should more closely approximate full satisfaction of those motives (i.e. increased fitness) than it does. On the other hand, if references to subconscious motives are merely figurative -- like talk of "selfish" genes -- it must be explained how they are to be literally interpreted. Either way it is necessary to deFreud evolutionary psychology. I will thus provide an account of evolutionary psychological explanation, and how it functions, when purged of reference to subconscious motives.

Lawrence Shapiro, University of Wisconsin, "The Presence of Mind."

Recent years have seen a growing movement to wed evolutionary theory to cognitive psychology, and among the matchmakers pushing for this marriage Cosmides and Tooby have been especially outspoken. While I am strongly in favor of bringing evolutionary considerations to bear on questions in cognitive psychology, I offer a more tempered view of how evolutionary theory is likely to change current practice in cognitive psychology. In particular, I resist Cosmides and Tooby's claim that evolutionary theory will reveal all adaptive behavior to be the product of specially dedicated cognitive modules. I conclude with a discussion of the proper place for evolutionary theory in cognitive psychology. It is my hope that a more selective view of the impact evolutionary theory will have on cognitive psychology will ease the union of the two fields, providing evolutionary psychology with a future free of unnecessary encumbrances.

Todd Grantham & Shaun Nichols, College of Charlestown, "Evolutionary Psychology: Ultimate Explanations and Panglossian Predictions"

Evolutionary psychologists maintain that the human mind is a set of cognitive mechanisms that are adaptations to the environment of the Pleistocene. This general evolutionary framework has led Cosmides, Tooby and other evolutionary psychologists to suggest two distinct projects. One project offers ultimate explanations of the mechanisms uncovered by cognitive science; the other project uses evolutionary biology to predict the existence of unexpected cognitive mechanisms. We maintain that while evolutionary psychologists have compelling arguments to support the explanatory project, the arguments for the predictive project fall back into Panglossian adaptationism. Evolutionary psychologists appeal to the complexity of cognitive traits to protect the explanatory project from traditional criticisms of Panglossianism. We elaborate the complexity argument and maintain that while the argument is persuasive, it has a rather limited range given current knowledge in cognitive science. We argue that Cosmides and Tooby's defense of the predictive project, on the other hand, overestimates the precision of evolutionary predictions and underestimates the precision of description already available to us.

ï Animal Issues: Studies Into Animals, Animal Sciences And Philosophy Of Animals. The goal is to create some continuity between the lectures, participants and discussions of these sessions. Possible issues of these sessions can be: history of animal sciences, animal subjectivity, animal ethics, animal politics, cultural views on animals, and human-animal relationships. Organizers: Chip Burkhardt (Burkhard@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu) and Susanne Lijmbach and (Susanne.Lymbach@ALG.TF.WAU.NL)

Session One: Animals in Paris

Louise E. Robbins, University of Wisconsin, "Zebras in Paris."

Eighteenth-century Parisians were fascinated with exotic animals. They ogled them at street fairs and the King's menageries at Versailles, read books about them, and kept monkeys and parrots as pets. Zebras were a particular favorite, and many people hoped that they could not only be imported to France and bred, but that eventually they would make elegant carriage horses. This paper is about the considerable effort that Louis XVI and his ministers undertook to obtain zebras from Africa for the King's menagerie. The tale of how and why the French acquired (or failed to acquire) zebras, and of what happened to them after they arrived in France illuminates a number of themes concerning the meanings of exotic animals in Enlightenment France. Zebras epitomized beauty and elegance as well as being a symbol of colonial power. Above all, however, they were raw material for domestication. Their recalcitrance at submitting to this process aroused a variety of responses, from respect to annoyance, that reflected prevailing attitudes toward the process of civilization.

Philippe Chavot, "The Paris Zoological Park And The Management Of A Colonial Fauna."

The Paris zoological garden was founded in 1934 as part of the Museum of Natural History. Amazingly enough, is was established close to the zoo of the 1931 Colonial Exposition. The story of these two zoos is instructive. The professors of the Museum had refused to leave the initiative of creating a modern zoological park to outsiders. Consequently, "La Coloniale" could only be a temporary installation. Despite its restricted scale, this zoological park attracted a large popular audience. When the colonial exhibition ended, the director of the zoo of "La Coloniale", Henry Th_tard, proposed to establish a permanent zoological park. A counter-project was soon promoted by the Museum. The Museum's project was finally chosen by the Ville de Paris on the basis of financial considerations.

I examine in this paper the different steps of the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Paris zoological park. I then analyze the rationale of Th_tard's and of the Museum's proposals. Although both projects relied on Hagenbeck's model, the aims they pursued were quite different, particularly in their visions of how a zoo should deal with entertainment, education and conservation. Nonetheless, both projects reflected a radical change in the way a colonial country such as France had to care for the resources constituted by the colonial fauna.

Richard Burkhardt, University of Illinois, "Unpacking Baudin: Animal Specimens And Competing Modes Of Scientific Practice In Early 19th Century French Zoology."

In March 1804, the French ship le G_ographe returned to France after a three and a half year voyage of geographic and scientific discovery to Australia. The Ship was loaded not only with crates of specimens, but also with living animals, including kangaroos and cassowaries from Australia and monkeys and a zebra from the Cape of Good Hope. The handling of the specimens brought back to France by this expedition (the Baudin expedition), highlights the issue of material practices in French zoology at the beginning of the 19th century. This paper focuses on issues regarding the control of the live and dead specimens from the time of their unloading in Port l'Orient, through their transport to Paris and their distribution to different collections, to their eventual deployment by different scientists in making their respective claims of scientific authority. It compares the work of three zoologists for whom the specimens were crucial: Francois Perob, J.-B. Lamarck, and F. Cuvier, who represented three respective (and in some measure, competing) modes of scientific practice: those of (1) naturalist-voyager; (2) cabinet naturalist; and (3) observer of live animals in captivity.

ï Sessions On Core-Periphery Relations In Scientific Knowledge Production In The Life Sciences. Organizer: Marilia Coutinho (Universidade de Sao Paulo; mcoutinho@originet.com.br)

Session Two: Core-Periphery Relations In Scientific Knowledge Construction In The Life Sciences ñ Case Studies In The Development Of Scientific Specialties

Adriana Chiancone, IVIC ñ Venezuela, "Laboratories In Latin America: The Case Of Immunology In Venezuela"

Several different immunology research laboratories in Venezuela were comparatively studied as to the strategies adopted by scientists to achieve the establishment of their scientific practices. In each one, the specific features of the research activities were analyzed in search of common components that might relate to those strategies, both individually ñ in terms of career choices and moves ñ and collectively, as to the mechanisms underlying social organization. The studies cases seem to reveal factors at play in the struggle for the constitution of scientific endeavors in Latin America as a whole.

Marilia Coutinho, Universidade de Sao Paulo ñ Brazil, "The Emergence Of Ecology And Environmental Studies In Brazil "

Ecology has become a prominent scientific discipline or at least a primary source of problems, theoretical frameworks or orientation in recent years. Much of this has to do with the environmental issue having become an all-encompassing mandatory problem, a set of general questions integrating an unavoidable agenda. Ecologists have, undoubtedly, played a role in this process and in the sites where Ecology has been a traditional well-established discipline, it has gained priority in the establishment of environmental studies. Nevertheless, Ecology as a scientific discipline is certainly an Anglo-American tradition. This paper will present the first outcomes of a research about the institutionalization of Ecology and of the environmental theme in a scientifically non-traditional country ñ Brazil. I will try to show that the emergence of Ecology as a distinct scientific practice in Brazil has followed major international trends as well as a favorable local environment, but that it has been largely short-circuited by the trans-disciplinary, context-driven environmental research trends.

Ana Lilia Gaona and Ana Barahona, National University of Mexico, "The Introduction Of Genetics In Mexico"

Experimental genetics was introduced in Mexico through the agricultural research programs in the 1930s and 1940s with official economic support. The Oficina de Estudios Experimentales (Special Studies Office) was established in 1944 by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government. This office centered its research in the genetic improvement of important economic species such as maize. This office had a relative success and joined in the 1960s the Oficina de Campos Experimentales (Experimental Fields Office) founded in the late 1930s, run by Edmundo Taboada, the first Mexican agricultural expert who had the opportunity to make graduate studies at Cornell University in 1932 and 1933 in plant breeding genetics. The new Instituto de Investigaciones Agricolas (Agricultural Research Institute) was run by Edmundo Taboada and during the 1960s directed the research programs in experimental plant genetics in Mexico.

Lea Velho, DPCT/IG/UNICAMP, "The Role Of American Scientists In The Emergence, Development And Shaping Of Botany And Zoology In Brazil"

This paper investigates the reasons why Botany and Zoology have not reached the state of development achieved by other scientific disciplines in Brazil. It explores the hypothesis that foreign naturalists who collected biological material or carried out research in Brazil, with few exceptions, were not able to form disciples and create traditions of research work as it was typical in other scientific disciplines. For doing so, the paper looks at the role played by foreign scientists in the emergence, development and shaping of Botany and Zoology in Brazil according to the following features: a) it covers the period from the beginning of this century up to the present, in an attempt to identify the changing nature of the relationship between foreign and local scientists and under the assumption that such relationship became more and not less important as the local scientific community was growing in number and capability; b) it looks only at the relations with American researchers given that in this century European influence in Latin America started to be replaced by the US; c) it is concerned not only with formal and institutional links established between American and Brazilian scientists but also with individual and informal contacts. The latter have been often overlooked although it is known that they can be quite influential in shaping directions of research as well as attitudes and working habits.

Maria Jesus Santesmases, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, "The Establishment Of Molecular Biology In Spain"

The establishment of molecular biology in Spain is a useful case study to show how knowledge and values were transferred from the core of the development of the discipline in the sixties to the periphery. During those years, Spanish academia experimented a influential development in modern biology: biochemistry, and cell and molecular biology. The case of molecular biology was taken place during a decade of deep changes in science policy and values in the Spanish scientific community. New knowledge was being introduced by young scientist who had been trained abroad, mostly in the United States. Both their training and the influence of the Nobel Prize awardee Severo Ochoa played a role in the process, during which a new research center was planned in Madrid, that was finally opened in 1975.

ïAdaptation and Selection

Session One:

Dominic Lewin, University of Leeds (email: phlpdl@arts-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk), "Organic Selection or Stabilizing Selection? The Question of Schmalhausen's 'broader principle'"

The debate over the evolutionary significance of adaptive modifications to the phenotype is discussed apropos the role of embryology and development within the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. One focus of this dispute was Lloyd Morgan's and Baldwin's notion of organic selection. Huxley described the principle of organic selections as a "minor mode of subsidiary historical restriction" upon natural selection, yet nonetheless "an important one which would appear to have been unduly neglected by recent evolutionists" (1942). G. G. Simpson believed there existed "singularly little concrete ground for the view that it is a frequent and important element in adaptation" (1953). Simpson was concerned that claims that the "Baldwin effect" is usual in adaptive evolution, "could be taken as an argument in favour of Neo-Lamarckism", and favoured the "broader principles" of Schmalhausen's stabilising selection, and Waddington's canalising selection. Dobzhansky is known to have discriminated against Waddington's ideas in favour of Schmalhausen's, and later described Waddington as a "frustrated Lamarckian" (1970). Focusing particularly on Schmalhausen, I discuss whether or not stabilising and canalising selection incorporated Simpson's Baldwin effect within "broader conceptions" conformable to the Modern Synthesis, or whether these notions were in fact antagonistic to Neo-Darwinism.

Michael Bradie, Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, "Dennett's Algorithmic Darwin"

Darwin's dangerous idea is that the apparent design in the Universe that so impressed thinkers from Aristotle to Paley can be explained as a result of an „algorithmic process" of evolution by natural selection. Dennett sees at least three dangerous consequences emerging: [1] it reconceptualizes the biological domain in a striking manner that threatens the very distinction between the „natural and the „artificial‰; [2] it undermines the applicability of a standard model of explanation to the domain of evolutionary phenomena; [3] it threatens to invade and undermine the cultural castles that human beings have constructed to distance themselves from the natural. I argue that Dennett‚s analysis is an exemplification of the process of explaining via metaphorical redescription. Along the way, the particular core metaphor Dennett employs reconceptualizes the very idea of what a proper evolutionary explanation looks like.

ï The Organism in History, Philosophy, and Biology, Chair: Ron Amundson, University of Hawaii at Hilo. Session organizer: Manfred D. Laubichler, Princeton University, (manfred@peaplant.biology.yale.edu)

Historically, organisms have been the central focus of natural history. They have been collected, hunted, stuffed, pressed, dissected, classified, measured, observed, and manipulated. During the last century a shift occurred towards a more universal biology first in the form of cell biology and biochemistry, later as molecular biology. As a consequence "the organism" began to disappear from much of the biological discourse.

Recently, "the organism" has been on the rebound. Programs of "organismal biology" have been created at many institutions and questions of biodiversity and conservation biology brought organisms back as part of the popular image of biology. There is, however, a discrepancy between the recently acquired popularity of organism and the role the organism concept plays in biological theory.

This session focuses on the "organism" as a central issue for (i) biological theory, (ii) historical investigation, and (iii) philosophical reflection. The papers will deal with the role of the organism concept in the theoretical foundations of biology, the role of organisms in shaping the history of biology, and the philosophical consequences of organism based theories.

Abstracts of Papers:

Robert N. Brandon, Duke University, "Using Organisms To Answer Our Questions vs. Letting Organisms Pose Our Questions,"

In this talk I will contrast two modes of work in biology. In the first biologists pose a question, and a tentative answer, within the context of biological theorizing, and then select the appropriate organism in order to test this proposed answer. Organisms, or more generally, biological phenomena, play a vital role as a check on biological theorizing, but play only this role in this conception of biology. In contrast, there is a mode of doing biology in which one allows the organisms to pose questions for biological research. The first mode corresponds (though imperfectly) to, on the one hand, hypothetico-deductivism and on the other a categorization of biologists in terms of fields that transcend specific specific groups of organisms (e.g., developmental biologist, evolutionary biologist). The second mode corresponds (again, imperfectly) to inductivism and a categorization of biologists in terms of organismic groups (e.g., lepidopterist, bryologist). There are tendencies in current philosophy of science to glorify the first way of doing biology at the expense of the second. I will argue that these tendencies lead to an impoverished view of biology and should be resisted.

Gerry Geison, Princeton University; and Manfred D. Laubichler, Princeton University and Yale University, "Organisms in Context"

Much attention has been paid of late to the question of "the right tools for the job." Such studies have focused, however, on the development of particular experimental techniques and the construction of presumably "stable" model organisms or experimental systems. Far less attention has been paid to another side of the story: The variability or organisms involved in such experiments. Here we offer evidence that the variability of organisms, sometimes even within the same species, had a decisive effect on the course of science and raise further issues about the replicability problem in experimental work.

We will focus on two episodes, one from physiology (the problem of the heartbeat) and the other from genetics (the early development of genetics), and will situate both episodes within the context of the question of national styles in science. In both cases, we will investigate how national differences in the response to Darwinian theory were linked to the adoption of different theoretical positions and to the choice of particular research organisms.

Manfred D. Laubichler, Princeton University and Yale University; and Gunter P. Wagner, Yale University, "Is There an Organism in this Room?"

One of the ironies of late 20th century biology is that a small but growing number of biologist continues to insist that there is an organism in biological theories. In their stubbornness they resemble Wittgenstein who could also not be convinced that there is no Rhinoceros in the room. Not unlike that (in)famous precedent, the clues on how to resolve this problem can be found in the logical structure of the question.

Here, we will ask what role the organism concept plays in the theoretical structure of biology. We will identify the kind of biological questions that revolve around the organism and how an appropriate organism concept would look like. We will argue that the exact meaning of the organism concept can only be defined within a specific biological context. The organism concept is thus the focus of different theoretical questions. We will demonstrate how in each case the appropriate notion of the organism can be derived out of the logical structure of the theory that represents the specific biological process in question. Finally, we will suggest a theoretical structure that allows to integrate the different representations of the organism concept. We will argue that such a structure can be part of the conceptual foundation of "organismal biology."

ï Normative Issues in Genetics Organizer: David Magnus

In these sessions we will explore some of the key conceptual and causal notions associated with genetics and their normative implications. What is a genetic disease? What is the significance of applying that label? How has past usage of genetic concepts influenced medical practice, and what lessons does that hold for us today? One session will focus on the lessons to be learned from the past, while the other will focus more on the implications of recent work on causality and DNA.

Chair: Suzanne Holland, University of Puget Sound

Session Three.

Kelly C. Smith The College of NJ , "The Concept Of A Genetic Disease"

The concept of disease in general, and genetic disease in particular, has received relatively little attention in the philosophical literature despite its daily use in both the lay and professional press. In this paper, I want to examine some of the classic views on disease and related concepts with an eye towards assessing their adequacy in the context of present day knowledge. These concepts include deviation from normality, causal selection in complex systems, precipitating factor analysis, susceptibility, manipulability and epidemiological/statistical modeling. I conclude that many of these concepts are inappropriate or misleading when applied to what are currently described as genetic diseases.

David Magnus , "The Concept of Genetic Disease"

It is a truism that both genes and environment play a causal role in the expression of any trait. The decision to classify a disease as "genetic" has changed over time, and the concept is currently expanding due to several factors (gene therapy, increased understanding of the role of genes in non-inherited diseases). At the same time, new information about the genetic basis of the paradigm "genetic diseases" (Huntington's, Cystic Fibrosis) calls into question the validity of the concept of genetic disease. The implications of these developments for biomedical practice will be discussed.

ïDisciplinary Definitions

Sylvia Culp, Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, "Explaining the Stability of Molecular Biology as a Laboratory Science"

In "The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences" (1992) Ian Hacking claims that laboratory sciences not operating at the frontiers of research can have the kind of stability that leads to the cumulative establishment of scientific knowledge. He argues, however, that this stability is not due to what he labels as the "easy" explanation that science "discovers" the truth. Rather, he argues that, stable laboratory science happens when theories and laboratory procedures (for creating and measuring phenomena) evolve so that they match each other and are mutually vindicating.

In this paper I will respond to Hacking by arguing that stability within at least one laboratory science, molecular biology, need not be explained by self-vindication. As an example, I will show how knowledge about transcription (the process for converting genetic information in chromosomal DNA into a single strand of RNA) has been cumulative over the last 40 years. I will demonstrate that during this time there have been considerable changes in both theories about transcription and laboratory procedures for studying transcription. Finally, I will establish that these changes have not necessarily depended on the mutual vindication of theories and laboratory procedures.

Jill Lazenby, University of Toronto, "The Biologist's Many Selves: Social Identity Theory and Self- Categorization Theory Applied to the Biological Disciplines"

Are the biological sciences united? Or are they a fragmented collection of incommensurable specialties and sub- specialties? This tension between unity and disunity in the biological sciences is expressed at the level of the individual scientist. In different contexts, the same scientist may be a biologist, a botanist, a biophysicist, a cell biologist or a plant physiologist. Depending on the context, fellow biologists with different disciplinary categorizations may be recognised as members of the same "in-group", or seen as "out-group" members of a different discipline or specialty. Two theories in social psychology - social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT) - describe these perceptions and their consequences. SIT says that group membership is a positive aspect of self-identity, and that individuals tend to favour their in-group and discriminate against the out-group. SCT investigates how strongly identities are felt, and how they are triggered. In this paper I consider biology, biological specialties, and hybrid specialties with the physical and social sciences, to be sources of identity. Depending on the context, biological scientists will feel united as "biologists", or experience cross- disciplinary tensions with practitioners of other biological sciences that are analogous to problems encountered in interdisciplinary research. I show how historical, philosophical and sociological studies of these disciplinary divisions can provide information about both their potential in-group characteristics, and about the contextual cues that trigger particular identities and the concomitant tendency to out-group discrimination. I use examples from contemporary photosynthesis research, and from interdisciplinary climate change research to illustrate the use of this model.

Thursday, July 17, 4:00 p.m.-5:30 p.m.

ï Connections Between Philosophy Of Biology And Philosophy Of Psychology. Organizer: Valerie Hardcastle (valerie@vt.EDU).

Session Four: Biology Informs Psychology

Stephen Downs, Utah, "Ontogeny, Phylogeny and the Development of Science"

Some nineteenth century biologists believed that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny: that an individual organism passes through stages of development that represent the adult stages of its evolutionary ancestors. Haeckel was one of the main proponents of this view, naming it the Biogenetic Law. Due to the overwhelming evidence against it, the law was rejected and has not been defended in biology since the nineteen twenties. A version of this view is held by a significant number of contemporary philosophers and historians of science and developmental psychologists who propose that children's cognitive development recapitulates cognitive development in the history of science. Closer examination reveals that few researchers on scientific development argue explicitly for recapitulation. Rather, theorists claim that the psychological investigation of children's cognitive development will lead to a better understanding of the cognitive development of science. In this paper I argue that neither the strong recapitulation view, nor its weaker derivative provide plausible accounts of scientific development. To reject the strong and weak versions of the recapitulation thesis is not, however, to reject the claim that scientific development is analogous to some kind of evolutionary process. Thomas Kuhn and many others have made this suggestion, and while agreeing with it in spirit, I will argue that it is important to stress just exactly what kind of evolutionary process is envisaged.

Mark Bedau, Reed, "Supple Ceteris Paribus Laws in Biology and Psychology"

It is well known that the (purported) laws of psychology hold only ceteris paribus, only if everything else is equal. Psychological ceteris paribus laws are controversial and contemporary opinion is divided about their source, significance, legitimacy, and nature. Analogous ceteris paribus laws govern biological phenomena. Furthermore, since biological ceteris paribus laws can be synthesized in artificial life computer models, we can study them with empirically accessible and precisely manipulable thought experiments. By comparing ceteris paribus laws in psychology with those observable in artificial life models, this paper concludes that (i) a special category of ceteris paribus laws--what I call "supple" laws--can be found in biological and psychological phenomena; (ii) the source of supple laws is the ability of biological and psychological systems to respond appropriately to an open-ended and unpredictable range of contextual contingencies; (iii) due to this source, supple ceteris paribus laws are non-computational in principle, even though they can be realized in underlying computational processes (such as artificial life models); (iv) supple ceteris paribus laws reflect a kind of "intelligence" that is central to both living and mental phenomena.

Elliot Sober, University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Morgan's Canon"

In his Principles of Comparative Psychology, Lloyd Morgan stated a rule of inference that has come to be called Morgan's Canon: If a behavior can be explained by attributing to an organism a "higher" psychological faculty, and also by attributing to it a "lower" psychological faculty, the latter attribution should be preferred. Morgan tried to provide a Darwinian justification of his principle; others have thought that it is a straightforward instance of Ockham's razor. This paper assesses these various attempts to justify the canon and provides a new line of argument.

ï Animal Issues: Studies Into Animals, Animal Sciences And Philosophy Of Animals. The goal is to create some continuity between the lectures, participants and discussions of these sessions. Possible issues of these sessions can be: history of animal sciences, animal subjectivity, animal ethics, animal politics, cultural views on animals, and human-animal relationships. Organizers: Chip Burkhardt (Burkhard@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu) and Susanne Lijmbach and (Susanne.Lymbach@ALG.TF.WAU.NL)

Session Two: Animal Ethics

Thijs Visser, University of Leiden (the Netherlands), "Playing God And Playing Allah: Moral Considerability Of Animals In Christianity And Islam."

Both religions, Christianity and Islam, consider man "the Crown of Creation", conferring upon him domination over the other animals. In principle therefore man has a moral right to use animals for his own benefit. But there have been always set limits to his action. One of the most widespread limits is cruelty towards animals. This is considered a sin, but its appreciation depends whether it is committed intentionally or not. Another approach is the ethics of stewardship, also encountered in both religions. Nature, c.q. animals are not only to use, but also to conserve and to protect, which grant them moral considerability for their own sake. This will be illustrated by the case of genetic engineering of animals, another, very controversial limit to human enterprise. The limits here are rather concrete in the shape of species barriers, that can be transgressed by this biotechnique. It may be experienced like a violation of God's creation, hence the expression of "Playing God". In this paper I shall investigate how Islamic and Christian authors relate to this problem, with special consideration for "nature" used as moral argument, and domestication as a case in point.

Elmar Theune, Wageningen Agricultural University (the Netherlands), "Formative Experience And The Dutch Debate On Animal Biotechnology."

The Dutch public debate on animal biotechnology has been concentrating on a genetically modified bull, named Herman. The birth of this bull in 1990 caused a debate that lasted for at least five years and that resulted in a very restrictive law on animal biotechnology. In my view it has made a great difference that it was a cow, the animal that is as much the Dutch national symbol as windmills are, that was the first genetically modified animal that caught public attention and not another kind of animal. I will defend my case by referring to Michael DePaul's notion of formative experiences. DePaul argues that not only arguments have an important place in any moral inquiry, but life experiences and experiences with literature, theatre, music and art as well. Such formative experiences play a significant role in developing and improving a person's moral sensibility. This would imply that it makes a difference to a person which experience comes first, because the earlier experiences will shape his or her moral intuitions more than the later ones. A later experience that does not fit in has to really cause a change of heart. DePaul has developed his notion of formative experiences with respect to individuals. I want to extend the notion to a public, realizing that there is no such thing as a collective formative experience. Still, people share certain values and also certain experiences. And, it seems obvious that public opinion is shifting slowly from one opinion to another not only because of reasoning experiences, but also because of the shared formative experiences of its members. So, first I will show how formative experiences may play a role in public inquiry, and then I will elaborate on how concrete formative experiences have shaped the Dutch debate on animal biotechnology.

ï Sessions On Core-Periphery Relations In Scientific Knowledge Production In The Life Sciences. Organizer: Marilia Coutinho (Universidade de Sao Paulo; mcoutinho@originet.com.br)

Session Three: Core-Periphery Relations In Scientific Knowledge Production In The Life Sciences ñ Case Studies In The Institutionalization Of Science In Peripheral Countries

Diana Obregon, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, "Cultivation Of Hansenís Bacillus: The Case Of A Latin American Scientist" By: This paper focuses on the case of a veterinarian-bacteriologist, Federico Lleras Acosta, struggling to make a scientific career in Colombia in the early 20th century. I examine the scientific and social/political reasons for Lleras choosing to culture Hansenís bacillus as his scientific research program. Starting with Hansen himself, in the late 19th century, numerous investigators attempted to grow the leprosy bacillus by many different methods. Despite claims of success by Lleras and others, scientists never accepted that the organism had been cultured. The field of bacteriology with emphasis on leprosy was very dispersed at Llerasís time: researchers in diverse institutional settings tried to solve the mysteries of M. leprae. This dispersion made difficult to find homogeneous conditions of replicability, and to fulfill the three Koch postulates. The reasons for Llerasís failure were not his own laboratory errors or his own scientific deficiencies. His lack of success was instead related to the specific nature of his research program and the institutional characteristics of his larger scientific community.

Ana Barahona and Ismael Ledesma, National University of Mexico, "Herrera And Ochoterena: Discursive And Socioprofessional Incommensurability." This paper talks about the more conspicuous aspects in the process of the institutionalization of Biology in Mexico in the 1920s and the role that Alfonso L. Herrera and Isaac Ochoterena had on it. The discursive and socioprofessional incommensurability between Herrera and Ochoterena led to the rejection of the study of evolution and the origin of life, as central to the unification of Biology. The new born community of ìdescriptive biologistsî was integrated to the medical community that had been for a long time considered as more consolidated. In 1929 Ochoterena established the Biology Institute that incorporate another official institutions established before by Herrera. The discursive and socioprofessional incommensurability between Herrera and Ochoterena defined the teaching and research Biology programs mainly in the National University of Mexico.

Pablo Kreimer, Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, "Laboratory Studies: Social And Political Implications In A Peripheral Context"

The aim of this paper is to show how several dimensions of scientific practices, like decision-making mechanisms, social relationships ìin and outî of the lab, and especially collaboration-links with foreign institutions, have important consequences which exceed the boundaries of the lab itself. Therefore, the study of certain basic topics seems very useful for an adequate understanding of the dynamics of the local scientific community as well as that of certain political decisions. Based on a comparative study conducted in French, English and Argentinean labs, it is possible to analyze how a ìperipheral conditionî is expressed, even in research groups which are considered as more ìintegratedî in the context of international science. Those groups seem to stand in contrast to other relatively isolated groups in the local community. As a result of this analysis, it is possible to point out that a peripheral condition is a complex situation that can only be understood by crossing cognitive dimensions with, on the one hand, socio-political relationships and, on the other, the international context.

ïAdaptation and Selection

Session Two:

Arno Wouters, Department of Philosophy, Utrecht University, "Function as Survival Value"

The study of the way in which the characters of an organism contribute to their reproductive success (the study of survival value) is an important part of biology. Philosophers differ in opinion about the explanatory status of such studies. There are roughly two approaches. Proponents of the 'backward looking' approach treat alleged attributions of survival value as historical statements about (recent) past contributions to the maintenance of the trait in the population. Proponents of the 'forward looking' approach treat such attributions as statements about how a trait contributes to the survival, reproduction or fitness of the organisms that have it. I argue that the forward looking account is basically right about the meaning of attributions of survival value but fails to give a satisfactory account of their explanatory force. I suggest an alternative account in which attributions of survival are explanatory not because they are backward or forward looking but because they show how an organism fits in its environment.

William Harms, Bowling Green State University (email: wfharms@bgnet.bgsu.edu), "Teleonomic Agency: Toward a Proper Functions Theory of Normativity"

The theory of proper functions as developed by Millikan and others can be extended to give a naturalistic account of agency and agent-binding normativity, thus grounding rational and moral norms. Agents are entities that are biologically "supposed" to be equipped with and governed by particular sorts of behavioral regulatory systems. "Full-blooded" normativity attaches to signals sent and received within such systems, and is only binding on agents of the relevant kind. This can account for both the phenomenological richness of agency and the peculiar subjective character of agent-bindingness. The result is a naturalistic account of normativity that explains why naturalistic descriptions of normative systems are not normative for the systems described (and so is non-reductive), yet allows appeal to facts about the world to secure objective grounding (satisfaction-conditions) for norms. This requires a basic theory of proper functions, and so increases the stakes involved in completing such a theory.

Glenn M. Sanford, Duke University, "Evolutionary History: The Difference Between 'Adaptation' and 'Adaptive'"

Reeve and Sherman (1993) define "adaptation" ahistorically as any phenotypic variant which results in the highest fitness among a specified set of variants in a given environment. They maintain that traditional, i.e., historical, conceptions of adaptations have paid little attention to the concerns of those investigating phenotype existence; instead, focusing upon the views of those concerned with evolutionary history. Their goal is to emphasize that when dealing with issues of phenotype existence, the primary questions concern the relative fitnesses of a set of phenotypes within a particular environment, not the evolutionary history of the variants. It is my contention that by collapsing the definitions of "adaptive" and "adaptation," ahistorical definitions of "adaptation" preclude a consistent separation of the issues of evolutionary history and current phenotype existence. Reeve and Sherman's approach does not resolve the problem created by attempting to apply biology's limited vocabulary to both evolutionary history and current phenotype existence; rather, it exacerbates the problem by failing to consider the needs of both practices simultaneously. Following a discussion of standard usages of "adaptation," "adaptive," and "relative adaptedness," I argue that Reeve and Sherman's concerns can be better addressed by maintaining a consistent distinction between "adaptive" and "adaptation."

ïThe Human Genome & Biological Determinism

Ph. Goujon, Université Catholoque de Lille, "The Secret Dreams of the Human Genome"

The human genome project has caused a great enthusiasm. In learning how to locate genes and to sequence them, scientists and the media affirm us that humans are now in possession of the tools to rectify mistakes of nature. In this conference, I want to question the assumptions that have been based on the belief that all of human existence is controlled by our DNA and its influence on the direction of biological research, in particular the Human Genome Project, which seeks to determine the complete DNA sequence that makes up human genes.

After some commentaries on the problems of Reduction and Reductionism and on the definition of the concept of gene, I show the dangers of the ideology of biological determinism and in particular of the ideology of genetic determinism which has been (and is) used to explain and justify inequality within and between society. In doing so, I'll put in evidence "the dangerous connections" of the new biology.

After adopting a reasonable skepticism towards the sweeping claims that have been made of the benefits to human kind of the modern biology, I'll put in evidence the "hidden" reasons of the ideology of what we can name the ideology of the "all genetics" (in particular, the epistemological, sociological and economic factors).

In conclusion, I'll try to demonstrate that we are in the presence of a new utopia which is taking slowly the place of the utopia of communication and which is the sign symptom of the problems which are affecting our society. In particular, this new utopia can be considered as the outcome of the lack of reference, and of the problem to build a new image of humans which, with its scientific reference seems, despite its dangers "to be capable" to respond to the existential distress of the modern man in "taking" his responsibility away more and more.

With the impact of the new biology on the new understanding that has the man of himself and with the importance of the "genocentric revolution" which is taking place now and its consequences, it's time to ask what objectives are now the real motivations behind the modern biology. I'll contemplate the possibility of a new eugenics with the elaboration, under the justification of genetics therapy, of a screening aimed at ensuring the birth of a "biologically correct child."

Lisa Gannett, University of Western Ontario (email: lgannett@julian.uwo.ca), "H.J. Muller And The 'Normal' Genome"

The Human Genome Project has been criticized from an evolutionary perspective for the pre-Darwinian typological thinking it evidences in the expression "_the_ human genome" and its associated treatment of genetic variation as deviation from a norm, rather than as the basis for evolution. In this paper, I develop the historical thesis that the conceptual framework of human molecular genetics, rather than ignoring evolutionary considerations altogether, has incorporated a _particular_ evolutionary perspective, specifically that of H.J. Muller. This possibility receives support from the claims of Elof Axel Carlson and Evelyn Fox Keller that Muller was the key influence on the _conceptual- development of molecular biology. In assessing and developing their analyses, I focus on the concepts of a "normal" genome and the harmfulness of mutations ("genetic load"). Historical context is provided by the acrimonious classical-balance debate between Muller and Theodosius Dobzhansky and its interconnections with the drift-selectionist debate between R.A. Fisher and Sewall Wright which preceded it, and the current neutralist-selectionist debate.

ïBiology and Gender

Maria Trumpler, Yale University (email: Maria.Trumpler@Yale.edu), Reviving Hypatia: Rachel Carson as Scientific Role Model in Contemporary Juvenile Biographies"

There has been growing concern over the past decade both with the general loss of confidence experienced by adolescent girls (as discussed in the runaway best seller Reviving Ophelia) and the still persistent gap between the number of science and math courses taken by male and female high school students. As historians of science have devoted more attention to women scientists, this focus has also filtered down into an increasing number of biographies of women scientists aimed at the juvenile market. Among such biographies currently in print, Rachel Carson is the most common subject, well ahead of Marie Curie.

This paper will examine the cultural meanings these biographies attach to Carson and her scientific work as they attempt to provide a role model for girls. What are the narrative structures and how does gender function in this genre? How do these biographies convey the nature of science and women's place within it? What aspects of Rachel Carson's work do they highlight? How do they interweave her personal life and her career, when she was such a private person? How do they describe the scientific community's response to the Silent Spring? The paper will conclude with some critical reflections on the problems with the construction of such historical role models.

In the second part of the paper I look into a second cultural environment: the second half of the Twenty Century . I try to draw some paralells between the way in which quantum theory has been interpreted and the way in which our views on evolution have changed. During the first half of this Century quantum mechanics was interpreted in such a way that its explanatory scope was restricted to a mechanistic view of the world that was essentially ahistorical. At the end of the Twentieth Century, however, an important interpretive current looks at quantum mechanics as a theory that promotes the view that our world, and everything in it has a history. I will conclude by elaborating some of the implications of this view for our concept of evolution, and the way in which these changes reflect changes in our understanding of the world at large.

Christopher Horvath, Illinois State University, "Measuring Gender"

Over the past several years, various operational definitions of gender have been used in studies of gender conformity in homosexual males. The goal of these studies is to demonstrate that childhood gender nonconformity (CGN) is either the proximate cause of adult homosexuality or an intermediate step in a series biologically mediated processes. An examination of several of these studies shows that the operational concepts of gender being used are based on stereotypes or on a mixture of other political and cultural assumptions. The hypothesis of a causal connection between the development of gender and sexual orientation is embedded within the context of a biological (evolutionary) understanding of human behavior. Thus, testing the hypothesis of a causal connection between CGN and sexuality requires a concept of gender that is compatible with the basic principles of biological causation and our current understanding of biological processes. I will argue that the concepts of gender used in this research are inappropriate because they do not distinguish the aspects of gender that might reasonably be suspected of having a significant biological causal component from those that are unlikely to have any significant biological basis. Using data gathered from studies on behavioral differences between heterosexual and homosexual men and women, I will derive and argue for a concept of gender that would make the hypothesis that there is a causal, biological, connection between CGN and adult sexual orientation testable.

Friday, July 18, 9:00 a.m.-10:30 a.m.

ï Connections Between Philosophy Of Biology And Philosophy Of Psychology. Organizer: Valerie Hardcastle (valerie@vt.EDU).

Session Five: Biology Informs Philosophy of Mind

Thomas Polger & Owen Flanagan, Duke, "Biological Explanations of Subjectivity"

The trend today in philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind is toward one or another flavor of naturalism. Theories of every sort are said to be "neurobiologically realistic," "biologically naturalistic," or just plain "natural." One particularly popular way to locate one theory of mind within the bounds of naturalism is situate one's philosophy within evolutionary theory, and to try to provide a plausible story of why the mental trait in question has come to be. In particular, an adaptationist explanation is sought for the mental traits we hold dearest to our hearts, such as consciousness.

We are critical of the mind sciences' vague appeal to Darwinism. But, we argue, careful attention to what biologists and philosophers of biology have to say about evolution--about adaptation, adaptiveness and function, as well as about whether consciousness should be thought of as a single biological trait--illuminates issues in both the philosophy of mind and biology.

Charbel Nino El-Hani & Antonio Marcos Pereira, Federal University of Bahia, Brazil, "Supervenience, Reduction, Emergence and Biological Causation: A Reply to Kim"

Since the beginnings of modern science, reductionism has been the paradigm in scientific explanation. Biological explanation is no exception. Many biologists seem to think that causal explanation must always proceed towards a reduction of biological processes to molecular phenomena. The gene-centric view of development is a standard example of this reductionist bias in biological explanation. The appearance of obviousness that reductionist explanations acquire, due to a mistaken parallel between supervenience and reduction, can be seen as one of the factors contributing for the prevalence of reductionism: if it is obvious that most biological processes are supervenient on physical-chemical phenomena, it is anything but obvious that it can or must be understood by means of a reduction to the molecular level. In this essay, we discuss the relations between supervenience, reduction and emergence, regarding biological explanation. The argument is developed as a polemic against Kim. This philosopher argued that mind-body supervenience leads to a dilemma: if mind-body supervenience fails, mental causation is unintelligible; if it holds, mental causation is again unintelligible; hence, mental causation is unintelligible. A question is raised by his argument: is the causal efficacy of all properties that supervene on basic physical properties unintelligible? He answers: no, because with properties like biological and chemical properties, we are much more willing to accept a reductionist solution. Here we try to show that, first, biological properties are not so easily reducible as Kim assumes, and, second, that reduction is not the only way out of Kim's dilemma: emergence can lead to another escape route, solving Kim's dilemma in the case of both biological and mental properties.

This work was partially supported by grants from PICDT-CAPES (C.N.E.) and PIBIC/UFBA-CNPq (A.M.P.)

ï Animal Issues: Studies Into Animals, Animal Sciences And Philosophy Of Animals. The goal is to create some continuity between the lectures, participants and discussions of these sessions. Possible issues of these sessions can be: history of animal sciences, animal subjectivity, animal ethics, animal politics, cultural views on animals, and human-animal relationships. Organizers: Chip Burkhardt (Burkhard@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu) and Susanne Lijmbach and (Susanne.Lymbach@ALG.TF.WAU.NL)

Session Three: Animals and Culture

Elizabeth Hanson, "Pennies For Elephants: American Zoos And The Popular Meaning Of Wildlife, 1870-1940."

Between 1870 and 1940 more than one hundred zoological parks and gardens opened in American cities. Planners and managers of the new zoos distinguished their institutions from earlier menageries by stating their mission as more than recreation: their goals also included the advancement of science, public education, and the preservation of rare species. How audiences perceived the zoo's mission is less clear. But wherever zoos were established, they received an enthusiastic -and active- public reception: local people rushed to collect and donate animals. The variety of animals offered in correspondence to zoo directors, from lions and bears to three-legged chickens, reveals a range of ideas about what zoos were for. Donating animals to the zoo could also be a community project. In 1914, the Boston Post coordinated a campaign for the city's children to donate their pennies to purchase three retired sideshow elephants for the new Franklin Park Zoo. More than 50.000 spectators crowded the ceremony in Fenway Park on the day the governor of Massachusetts presented the animals to Boston's mayor, who accepted them for the city. This paper explores popular interpretation of the zoo at the turn of the twentieth century through the activities of an engaged zoo public - people who collected and donated animals.

Greg Mitman, University of Oklahoma, "True-Life Adventures: Disney's Nature In Cold War American Culture."

Disney's True-life Adventures, a nature film series that began with Seal Island in 1948, helped establish the marketability of nature as a commodity for consumption within Cold War American culture, and cultivated an appreciation for wilderness as a source of aesthetic value beyond the limited membership of conservation organizations within the United States. Disney's naturalists, which included amateurs and scientists alike, found their photographic journeys into wilderness reinstalled a sense of individualism and freedom and thereby offered a therapeutic restorative to the conformist trends of 1950s American mass society. For the general public, the nature Disney captured on screen reinforced an admixture of family and religious values, thought to represent the conventional ideals of the American suburban home. In this paper, I explore the whidespread appeal of Disney's True-life Adventures by investigating how naturalists, conservation organizations, and the middle-class public made meaning out of Disney's nature on screen in different, but overlapping, ways.

ï Developmental Systems Theory (DST), Organizers: Susan Oyama, Paul Griffiths, Ron Amundson, and Lenny Moss

Session One: DST: What Genes Can't Do.

Lenny Moss. Introduction: The point of departure for this session is the idea that typical references to genes or genomes as "instructions" or "blueprints" for "making an organism" trade upon a conflation of different meanings of "the gene" which have been derived from separate disciplinary contexts. Where a gene can said to be a gene for a phenotype, as in genes for diseases such as Huntington's disease or cystic fibrosis, the referent of "gene" is not some definite entity but rather the absence of that specific nucleic acid sequence which is required for normal function. Where a gene is a gene for some definite sequence of nucleic acids, as in the gene for N-CAM, or a gene for a glycosyl-transferase, its relationship to a phenotype is indeterminate and capable of contributing to any number of different (both normal and pathological) phenotypes. Only by conflating these senses of "the gene" does one derive a usage which simultaneously implies both some necessary sequence of nucleic acids and a determinate relationship to a specific phenotype. The objective of this session will be to consider three different senses of "the gene", i. e., the transmission gene, the molecular gene, and the selfish gene, and delineate some of the proper limits of each.

Bob Perlman, University of Chicago: "What Transgenic Mice Tell Us About Development"

The ability to disrupt a gene by homologous recombination in embryonic stem cells and then to create mice that have null mutations in this gene is one of the technological triumphs of contemporary biology. While the study of these "knockout" mice has yielded new information about physiology and disease, many of these mutants have phenotypes that can't easily be understood simply in terms of the known activities of the gene products they are lacking. These results provide an opportunity to reinterpret studies on the role of genes in development. Dobzhansky's aphorism, "Heredity is particulate, but development is unitary," captures the incongruence between genetic and organismal approaches to development and the difficulties in interpreting development in terms of the actions of individual genes. I will discuss the resources that reduce the dependence of developing organisms on the activity of individual genes and enable them to maintain development in the face of mutations or other perturbations. These resources include maternal gene products that provide non-genomic information to the developing organism, gene families whose products have overlapping or redundant biological activities, regulatory networks that enable cells to function when one component of the network is absent, and feedback mechanisms by which organisms monitor their growth and regulate their development. Properly interpreted, studies of transgenic mice may yet tell us something important about regulatory processes in developing organisms.

Rob Knight & Paul Griffiths: "What Selfish Genes Can't Do"

Natural selection occurs when individuals in a population differ in their ability to cope with a common selective environment. Macroevolutionary processes involving selection between species and higher taxa rather than within populations of one species are both empirically and conceptually controversial. Gene selectionists have neglected equivalent distinctions at the molecular level. We apply the main existing species concepts to DNA sequences in a search for groupings within which there can be natural selection. The potential for adaptation through natural selection at the molecular level turns out to be more limited than is often suggested. As a prelude to this investigation we show that the individuals to which these various grouping criteria are applied should be classical molecular genes and not the evolutionary genes introduced by G.C Williams. We conclude with a suggestion for improving on the classical molecular gene concept.

Ron Amundson, "Methodological Preformationism in Evolutionary Biology"

Developmental biology has been only on the fringes of mainstream evolutionary theory since the Modern Synthesis. Specific evolutionary arguments can be given which assert the irrelevance of embryological development to evolution. Advocates of the importance of development have recently begun to use the term "preformationist" as an epithet against this anti-developmental evolutionism, likening it to the ancient view that the germ of an organism contains a tiny but fully formed adult. The same epithet was used by embryologists against particulate theories of inheritance, including Mendelism, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In this paper I will argue that mainstream evolutionary theory is indeed committed to a sort of Methodological Preformationism, a research strategy which marginalizes developmental biology while making only minimal commitments regarding the actual nature of embryological development. This strategy may be responsible for part of the success of Synthesis biology. Nevertheless its byproduct is an a priori restriction on the scope and nature of evolutionary explanation. The relevance of development to evolution cannot even be tested without violating the research strategy of Methodological Preformationism.

ïDarwin, Spencer and Owen

Daniel Becquemont, Université Lille, France, "Spencer's Views On Darwin's Theory"

Spencer, in his Principles of Biology, tried to include Darwin's theory of natural selection in his own laws of evolution. He divided the complex network of relationships which formed the concept of "struggle for existence" in Darwin's theory into two types of hierarchical actions: direct and indirect adaptation. In Spencer's principles, the struggle for existence ceased to be a metaphorical expression and was used with its former pre-Darwinian meaning. Natural selection was understood by him mainly as a secondary process submitted to a more general balance of nature, or reduced to a mere process of elimination. The Darwinian theory could be expressed by concepts borrowed from Spencer's Principles, in abstract terms of equilibrium. Natural selection could conform to the same mechanical principles as all other forms of equilibration. Twenty years later, when Weismann's theories began to challenge Spencer's belief in the inheritance of acquired characters, Spencer took a more negative stand and spoke of the "insufficiency of natural selection". He argued that a theory which maintained that the only explanation to evolution was natural selection should be considered as a perversion of Darwinism and "biological fetishism".

Mark McLaren, University of Pittsburgh (email: e-mail: mdmst37+@pitt.edu), Categorical Imperative: Richard Owen's Theory of Spontaneous Generation and Its Implications for Historiography of Nineteenth-century Life Sciences"

As part of a broader critique of Darwinian evolutionary theory, comparative anatomist Richard Owen advocated a quasi-Lamarckian theory of spontaneous generation. At first blush, this seems puzzling, for as Adrian Desmond and others have noted, Owen was generally a staunch opponent of Lamarckian evolutionism. How could he embrace spontaneous generation without thereby embracing a transmutationist view of species? Nicholaas Rupke suggests that Owen adopted his view of spontaneous generation because it was contrary to Darwinian evolution, or, to what seemed an inevitable corollary: that all life descended from a limited number of organisms which were the result of a miraculous event. But Owen's view was much more than a reaction to Darwinism. This paper will show that, although Owen's reasons for believing in the possibility of spontaneous generation were not obvious, they were fully consistent with his scientific methodology and they followed naturally from his views on serial homology. Like Lamarck, Owen believed that spontaneous generation was continually taking place on earth - as the inevitable result of physical forces. Owen's views are significant for at least two reasons. First, depictions of his anti-Darwinian stance as theologically or politically motivated have tended to overlook or distort the naturalistic, conceptual aspects of his theistic biology. Such treatments perpetuate the mythical dichotomy between atheistic evolutionists and anti-evolutionary theists who were forced to alter their views to accord with Darwinian evolution. Second, categories such as "materialism" and "vitalism" are ill-suited to an analysis of Owen's position, a point which has serious historiographical implications.

Rasmus Winther, French-American International School, San Francisco, 94102 (email: rasmus@leland.stanford.edu), "Darwin On External Sources Of Heritable Variation"

Darwinian theory after the Modern Synthesis associates variation and its inheritance with internal causes such as mutation, and links adaptation with external causes such as selection. Although Darwin's conception of the external sources of adaptation coincides with the modern position, his views about the causes of variation differ from current theory. In the 19th century, biologists identified several types of external sources of heritable variation. Before Weismann postulated the sequestered germ-line, the environment was perceived as acting through either the entire body or the reproductive organs to trigger or direct variation. Initially, Darwin held that the environment directed adaptive changes through the reproductive organs. Then rethinking his position between 1837-1838, he reasoned that a changing environment simply triggered heritable variation, whether adaptive or not, in the reproductive organs. He continued to insist that the environment was necessary to generate variation. Darwin also maintained that the body was a site for environmentally-directed heritable variation. Whereas the first edition of the Origin of Species emphasized the effect of a changing environment on the reproductive organs, the last edition, as well as the Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication, stressed the effect on the body as a whole. Pangenesis provides an explanation for how the environment affects the reproductive organs and the body to produce heritable variation. Pangenesis was as much a hypothesis for the sources of variation as for the mechanisms of heredity. Unlike modern biologists, Darwin held that the causes of variation are always external.

ïEnvironmental Issues

Mags Adams, Lancaster University (email: m.adams@lancaster.ac.uk), "Endocrine Disruption: A case for implementing the Precautionary Principle".

The risks and uncertainties associated with such things as dioxins, pesticides, industrial chemicals, some metals and not a few natural chemicals are slowly starting to be recognised. The fact that some of these chemicals and compounds cause disruption to the endocrine systems of wildlife and humans is not a minor issue. The problem is that, because these substances are at large in our environment, it is difficult to trace any direct cause and effect mechanism. This has huge implications for regulators - are their hands tied due to lack of evidence? - or does such a situation call for precautionary action?

The dilemma is whether models can accurately predict what will happen once another chemical is released into the environment and whether it is necessary to wait for that evidence before action is taken. My proposition is that action should be taken to avoid the possible consequences - but what to do about those endocrine disruptors that are already at large? Can modeling show us the whole extent of the situation? What action should be taken in the meantime? This paper will examine the role of the Precautionary Principle in forming answers to such questions and will outline the strengths and limitations of risk assessment in the process.

Uta Eser, Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities, University of Tuebingen, Germany, "Ecological And Normative Fundamentals Of Value-Judgements In Conservation Biology: The Case Of Non-Indigenous Plants In Nature-Conservation Areas"

Basic ecology as a value-free natural science is limited to mere descriptions of natural communities and their anthropogenic induced changes. Management decisions, however, need assessments of these changes and therefore require values and norms. Origin and validity of those norms are analyzed in a case-study: the presently vehement discussion in Germany, concerning the management of so-called 'biological invasions'. Non-indigenous plants are conceived as a problem for ecological or economic reasons. However, the problems caused by 'aliens' seem to be exaggerated compared to other environmental problems. Since the subjects of the conflict are 'non-natives' the debate tends to be somewhat ideological. Accused of a xenophobic bias ecologists usually refer to the objectivity of their science, which is supposed to be free of value-judgements. The objective of my study is to investigate the extent of value-judgements within ecology. The arguments of the debate are analyzed and evaluated concerning their tacit or explicit theoretical, ethical or political assumptions. In particular I discuss, if it is possible to use value-laden terms like 'aliens' or 'invasion' in a scientific value-free way without preforming value-judgements by their negative connotations.

This work is part of an interdisciplinary research programme 'Ecology and Environmental Ethics' which is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Scientific Research (FKZ 0339561)

Thomas Potthast, University of Tuebingen (e-mail: thomas.potthast@uni-tuebingen.de), "Evolutionary Theory And Guiding Principles In Conservation Ethics - A Critical Survey Of The Relationships Between Evolutionary Biology, Nature Conservation, And Ethics"

The perspective of change in ecosystems - within communities as well as speciation processes - have become a focus of ecology, nature conservation, and environmental ethics. The idea to protect evolutionary potentials and processes was developed mainly in response of threats to Global Biodiversity. Arguments supporting human evolutionary responsibility explicitly refer to evolutionary theories (e.g. island biogeography, population genetics). The general question is: what constitutes the relationship between i) biodiversity as the result of evolution, ii) evolutionary theories, and iii) aims, justification, and ethics of conservation? A short history of concepts is presented to highlight how the idea of evolution was integrated into conservation practice and theory. This includes different scientific theories and perceptions of nature, and a variety of ethical stances.

Concepts of change and evolutionary processes within ecosystems have a great impact on evaluations and value judgements, because - of course - conservation efforts are shaped by the way nature is perceived. Therefore, I will discuss which aspects are represented in the evolutionary view, especially concerning the role of time and individuality. In some respect these aspects conflict with other concepts of ecology as well as conservation. Thus, some epistemological and ethical reflections on the status of 'scientific reasoning using evolution' within nature conservation will be presented. It will be shown that arguments from evolutionary biology and ethical reasoning cannot be separated and that therefore a sound analysis of their interrelations will be necessary for further development of both, public policy as well as theoretical and epistemological debates.

ï Going Molecular. One measure of the maturation of a science is its conversion from an independent discipline into a set of tools utilized by workers in other fields. For some years, historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science have been interested in the development of molecular biology, primarily as an outgrowth of classical genetics. This session considers not the origins of molecular biology, but its penetration into other sciences. In the last 30 years, nearly every branch of the life sciences has ìgone molecularî; fields from embryology to ecology have incorporated molecular techniques in the reductionist drive toward identifying the smallest units of natural change. In this session, we will consider the intellectual, technical, and social consequences of this pattern. Lindley Darden examines how study of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, traditionally associated with the early 19th century naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck and widely discredited near the beginning of this century, again became serious science through molecular techniques in the study of directed mutation. Martha Keyes examines the problem of the ìviralî disease scrapie and why a theory of infectious proteins became so controversial. Both Keyes and Darden touch on the constraints on biological theory imposed by the ìCentral Dogmaî of genetic information flow, and on the evolution and broadening of that theory to incorporate new molecular data. Greg Morgan picks up the evolutionary theme in his paper on the development of the molecular clock as a technique for measuring the rate of evolution. Robert Olby looks at neuroscience going molecular; his comparison of research on ìmemory moleculesî in the 1950s with that in the 1980s and 1990s illustrates that molecular biology has been used as a wedge to distance ìmodernî science from discredited earlier research ñ even when clear conceptual and historical links exist between them. Nathaniel C. Comfort shows that ìgoing molecularî has also been used to link the past with the present in order to redress perceived deficiencies of credit. He re-examines the standard myth that classical cytogeneticist Barbara McClintock was ìrediscoveredî when molecular biologists in the 1970s identified and cloned transposable elements, which she discovered in corn in the 1940s. The papers in this session are linked by themes including the explanatory power of molecular biologyís ìcentral dogmaî; the use of molecular techniques to revise the internal history of a discipline; and interdisciplinary connections among different branches of the life sciences. Molecularization of the life sciences has had a profound impact on late 20th century biology; in this session we hope to illustrate some examples of that impact and raise questions of how historians, philosophers, and sociologists might come to grips with the ruthless reductionism and interdisciplinary synthesis implied by ìgoing molecular.î Organizers: Nathaniel C. Comfort and Lindley Darden (darden@umiacs.umd.edu)

Session One:

Lindley Darden, University of Maryland, ìFrom Inheritance of Acquired Characters to Adaptive Mutationî

The problem of inheritance of acquired characters has a recent, molecular incarnation in the controversy about adaptive (directed) mutation in bacteria. Since 1988, when Cairns and colleagues purportedly found evidence for such mutations, controversy has ensued about whether such adaptive mutations actually exist. Evidence for directed changes in DNA sequences, controlled by environmental conditions in which such a sequence would be more fit, would be striking. It would be an anomaly for both the central dogma of molecular biology and the Neo-Darwinian, synthetic theory of evolution. This anomaly and its implications are examined within the context of a perspective on theory change developed in previous work: anomaly-driven theory redesign. As I have argued elsewhere (Theory Change In Science, 1991), scientific theories change in response to empirical anomalies, conceptual problems, and interfield connections. This case examines the implications of a molecular version of inheritance of acquired characters for possible changes in the most widely applicable of all generalizations in molecular biology, the central dogma, and for the most widely applicable theory in evolutionary biology, the synthetic theory.

Robert Olby, University of Pittsburgh, ìMemory Molecules: A Case Study in the Impact of Molecular Biology on the Neurosciences?î

The paper opens with a brief sketch of the differing views that have been expressed concerning the nature of the impact of molecular biology upon neurobiology and of the benefits of inter-disciplinarity. Then it takes the case of ìmemory moleculesî from the 1960s and investigates the nature of the support for this research and the disciplinary allegiance of the actors in the controversies that ensued. Although the controversies of the 1960s came to an end, research into the chemistry of memory continued unabated. Therefore it is possible to chart the impact of some of the developments in molecular biology upon this field by comparing the chemistry of memory in the ë60s with the chemistry of memory in the ë80s, and by examining the retrospective comments of researchers looking back two decades to the work of the ë60s. These retrospectives show a deliberate wish to distance recent work from its origins in the ë60s.

Greg Morgan, University of Pittsburgh, ìEmile Zuckerkandl, Linus Pauling and the Molecular Evolutionary Clockî

In the early 1960s, Linus Pauling and Emile Zuckerkandl utilized techniques from molecular biology in the hope of illuminating the evolutionary process. Following a cross-species analysis of hemoglobin amino acid sequences, they proposed an idea which became known as ìthe evolutionary molecular clock hypothesis.î They suggested that hemoglobin had an approximately constant rate of evolution and its ìclock-likeî evolution could be used to estimate the time of past speciation events. I trace the roots and early development of the Zuckerkandl-Pauling collaboration and the reception of their molecular view within the organismally based community. More specifically, I examine the responses of Ernst Mayr and George Gaylord Simpson, both who (at least at first) resisted the evolutionary molecular clock hypothesis and the molecular approach to evolution.

Friday, July 18, 11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

ï Connections Between Philosophy Of Biology And Philosophy Of Psychology. Organizer: Valerie Hardcastle (valerie@vt.EDU).

Session Six: Psychology Informs Biology

Gary Hatfield, University of Pennsylvania, "Mental Functions as Constraints on Neurophysiology: Biology and Psychology of Color Vision"

The concept of function has been prominent in both philosophy of biology and philosophy of psychology. Philosophy of psychology, or philosophical analysis of psychological theory, reveals that rigorous functional analyses can be carried out in advance of physiological knowledge. Indeed, in the area of sensory perception, and color vision in particular, knowledge of psychological function leads the way in the individuation and investigation of visual neurophysiology. Psychological functions constrain biological investigation. This example is of general interest as an instance of the relation between biological and psychological functions and their "wet" realizations.

Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Virginia Tech, "Understanding Functions: A Pragmatic Approach"

In an article celebrating the twentieth anniversary of Larry Wright's seminal paper, "Functions," Peter Godfrey-Smith asserts that, "much of the literature [on functions] has ... engaged in the refinement of Wright's original idea." Others label Wright's characterization "the Standard View." However, only by focusing on a very narrow use of the term is the apparent unanimity among philosophers of biology possible. How we understand the question a functional explanation in the biological and social sciences is supposed to answer is crucially important for any philosophical analysis of functions and many philosophers of biology construe them much too narrowly. Consequently, the three sorts of analyses currently in vogue in philosophy are all at risk of death from a thousand failures. A different approach to understanding functions is required, one that is more faithful to science as it is actually practiced and to how functions are actually assigned.

In this essay, I shall outline a pragmatics of explanation for functions: Functions are simply what T is doing in o, relative to a domain of inquiry. However, the relativity of an explanatory structure distinguishes neither the biological and social sciences from physics and chemistry, nor functional explanations from any other.

ï Animal Issues: Studies Into Animals, Animal Sciences And Philosophy Of Animals. The goal is to create some continuity between the lectures, participants and discussions of these sessions. Possible issues of these sessions can be: history of animal sciences, animal subjectivity, animal ethics, animal politics, cultural views on animals, and human-animal relationships. Organizers: Chip Burkhardt (Burkhard@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu) and Susanne Lijmbach and (Susanne.Lymbach@ALG.TF.WAU.NL)

Session Four: Old New Views On Animal Science

Susanne Lijmbach, Wageningen Agricultural University (the Netherlands), "The Phenomenological View On The Animal Self And Its Implications For Current Debates About Animal Experiences."

The societal criticism on the ways in which animals are treated, has led to ethological theories and animal ethics in which animals are conceived as beings who experience their situation and treatments. But, the actual conceptions of animal experiences still are biased by a natural scientific view on animals and, therefore, on animal experiences. Knowledge of the meaning of animal experiences, however, requires a view on animals, which holds on experiences as distinct from processes in non-living nature. This view on animals is offered by Helmuth Plessner and Frederik Buytendijk. In "Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch", Plessner developed a philosophy of life, which makes understandable the emergence of the human self from the self of animals and plants. According to Plessner, the animal self appears to us as a bodily and environmentally bound self. The next stage of the self, the reflexive human self, is a logically necessary step in the development of life.

Buytendijk, a Dutch animal psychologist and colleague and friend of Plessner, demonstrated this bodily and environmentally bound animal self in his experiments with animals of different species. By means of some examples of these experiments, his phenomenological concept of animal experiences and his method of research into the meaning of animal behaviour will be explained. At the end some conclusions will be drawn with regard to the relevance of this phenomenological view on the animal self for actual, ethological and ethical debates about animal experiences.